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I. INTRODUCTION
The phone rings. A 911 dispatcher starts to answer, but the line
goes dead. The dispatcher calls back. No one answers. Was it a misdial
or a cry for help cut short? Because callers often expect help to arrive
when intentionally calling 911, the police respond to the address from
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which the call likely originated.' Police approach the house and knock
on the door. Again, no one answers. There may be an emergency inside,
so the police enter the house without a warrant and without consent. If
they find a heart attack victim lying on the floor, they might save a life.
If they find sleeping parents and a tech-savvy toddler, they might
educate and leave. But if they find evidence of a crime-say, cocaine or
illegal firearms-they might make an arrest based on evidence found
during their warrantless entry and search of the home.
Americans call 911 nearly 240 million times a year. Nearly
eighty million are hang-ups or inadvertent calls, conveying no
information. Police officers responding to such calls face a confounding
dilemma: society expects them to promptly prevent harm and render
aid, but the Fourth Amendment guarantees protection from
unreasonable searches. In an attempt to balance these interests, courts
rely on the emergency aid doctrine. Historically, the doctrine permitted
the police to respond, without a warrant, to situations where there was
an imminent risk to people and property.2 Recent expansions of the
emergency aid doctrine, however, may tacitly allow the government to
enter a home based merely on receiving a 911 hang-up-a type of call
conveying no information, initiated by an unknown party, and placed
for unknown reasons. Thus, the question arises whether these
expansions extend the emergency aid doctrine too far.
The emergency aid doctrine requires the police to have an
objectively reasonable basis to believe an emergency threatens
imminent harm to people and property.3 Yet, the Supreme Court has
not clearly defined what constitutes imminent harm, leading to the
widespread policy of conducting warrantless searches following 911
hang-ups.4 Some courts uphold these searches based on a generalized
presumption that 911 hang-ups are de facto emergencies involving
imminent harm, even though officers have no articulable facts to
believe an emergency exists.5 Such a presumption shifts the burden of
1. The police often respond to the caller's most likely location, typically the residence
associated with the phone number or a GPS or triangulated location of the caller's cell phone. See
infra Part III.
2. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ("[W]arrants are generally
required . . . unless the 'exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
(quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978))).
3. E.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam) (quoting Brigham, 547 U.S.
at 406); see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (noting that an exception to the
warrant requirement applies when "[a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable" (quoting
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394)).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
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proof from the government to the homeowner. Instead of requiring the
government to demonstrate why a warrantless search was reasonable
or necessary based on apparent imminent harm, a court's de facto
presumption forces individuals to justify why the police should not
invade their homes after receiving a mere 911 hang-up.6
This Note seeks to aid practitioners by highlighting common
errors that occur when analyzing 911 hang-up emergency aid
responses. It therefore considers what evidentiary weight should be
attributable to 911 hang-ups when analyzing the reasonableness of a
warrantless search in emergency aid situations. Part II explains why
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence applies to
searches incident to 911 hang-ups, and it examines the Court's most
recent articulations of the emergency aid doctrine. These articulations
are then contrasted with several lower-court interpretations of the
emergency aid doctrine in the context of 911 hang-ups. Given disparate
outcomes, Part III examines what information 911 hang-ups actually
convey, how police use that information, and how they respond to hang-
up situations where information is limited. The stark reality is that 911
hang-ups convey little or no information, yet the emergency aid doctrine
requires the police to have an objectively reasonable basis to believe
that an emergency exists before entering a home without a warrant.
Courts struggle with determining what quantum of evidence is
sufficient to meet this standard. To that end, Part III concludes by
exploring common judicial interpretations of what amounts to an
objectively reasonable basis in the context of 911 hang-ups.
Ultimately, this Note attempts to clarify the Supreme Court's
analysis of emergency aid situations. Such clarification is essential to
maintaining the balance between police power and individual liberty.
Thus, Part IV suggests interpreting 911 hang-ups as mere efforts to
communicate rather than as de facto cries for help. By focusing on the
quality and quantity of the information conveyed in 911 calls rather
than presuming an emergency exists, the burden to justify warrantless
entries remains with the government by requiring it to prove there was
an extant and apparent emergency. This Part further argues that 911
hang-ups are tantamount to anonymous tips, in that the police need to
6. See, e.g., Fisher, 558 U.S. at 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
[I]t is well settled that police officers may enter a home without a warrant "when they
reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid." We have stated
the rule in the same way under federal law, and have explained that a warrantless
entry is justified by the "need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury." The
State bears the burden of proof on that factual issue . . ..
(quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392; People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 921 (Mich. 1993)). For the
purposes of this Note, an apparent threat is one that is either self-evident because of its obvious
nature or reasonably inferred from articulable and particularized evidence.
2015]1 921
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corroborate anonymous information and any subsequent search must
be based on particularized evidence. Nonetheless, limited incursions
into the curtilage of a home may be reasonable when investigating 911
hang-ups. But absent any additional indices of an extant or apparent
emergency, or corroboration of a call's information, the emergency aid
doctrine does not permit the warrantless entry of a home.
Consequently, this framework aims to uphold constitutional protections
of the home while accommodating community expectations regarding
police responses to 911 calls.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE EMERGENCY AID DOCTRINE
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution7
A. The Reasonableness Requirement
The Supreme Court has emphasized that, while a warrant is
preferred,8 "the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen's personal security."9 As a threshold matter, the
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches of people,
houses, papers, and effects.10 Individuals, therefore, have a
constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in their homes that the
government cannot unreasonably breach regardless of whether the
matter motivating a search is criminal or noncriminal in nature." Yet,
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. E.g., King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856.
9. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) ("It is a basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Payton, 445 U.S. at 586; see
also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-53 (2012) (rejuvenating the trespass theory,
thought to have been rejected in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), under which even
an intrusion onto private property may constitute a Fourth Amendment search); 3 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 6.6 (5th ed. 2013) (discussing the constitutional protection of
privacy); Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in Fourth Amendment
Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 89, 91-92 (1992).
[Vol. 68:3:919922
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warrantless searches are permitted if they are reasonable, which
requires the government to have an objectively reasonable basis to
breach an individual's expectation of privacy.12
Accordingly, the appropriate standard for analyzing warrantless
searches is whether police action was reasonable.13 Reasonableness i
determined by objectively weighing the scope and nature of a
warrantless search against an individual's expectation of privacy.14 In
the context of warrantless searches incident to 911 hang-ups, therefore,
reasonableness i based on an individual's privacy expectations in his
or her home and whether society recognizes those expectations in light
of the scope, nature, and circumstances of the search.15 The Court
articulated this balancing of interests in the so-called emergency aid
doctrine.16
12. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 ("[Tlhe Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply
'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures .... .").
13. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 43 (1991).
14. For example, reasonable suspicion exists when there are facts sufficient to lead a
reasonable officer to believe that a brief investigatory detention is necessary. If an officer believes
that a person is armed and poses a threat to an officer (perhaps due to an officer's personal
knowledge of the suspect, a bulge in the suspect's pants, or the suspect's possible involvement in
a robbery), the subsequent detention and pat-down of the person for weapons may be permissible,
which is commonly referred to as a "Terry frisk." See Terry, 392 U.S. 1. Probable cause is the
standard for arrests and searches and it exists when there are sufficient facts or circumstances to
lead a reasonable officer to believe that a crime is or has been committed. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 91 (1964). Probable cause for a search exists when a reasonable officer believes that the items
to be found or seized are in the place to be searched. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175-76 (1949). Sometimes, not even probable cause plus a warrant is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) ("A compelled surgical intrusion into an
individual's body for evidence ... implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude
that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of a crime."). The
standard of belief for emergency circumstances is an objectively reasonable basis. Brigham, 547
U.S. at 406.
15. See generally Slobogin, supra note 13 (proposing that whether a search is reasonable
should be based on its level of intrusiveness balanced against the degree of certainty that it will
be successful).
16. Warrantless exceptions often reflect a community's expectations regarding police action,
social control, and emergency responses that make it impractical or impossible to obtain a warrant.
See Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 261, 271-90; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 387-95 (1978) (one of the first
United States Supreme Court cases explicitly discussing the validity of conducting an initial,
warrantless emergency search of a residence in order to render aid); United States v. Najar, 451
F.3d 710, 714-15 (10th Cir. 2006) ("From . . . Mincey, the emergency aid exigency emerged,
informed by the practical recognition of critical police functions quite apart from or only tangential
to a criminal investigation.").
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B. The Emergency Aid Doctrine
The emergency aid doctrine applies when emergency
circumstances require an immediate police response to protect people
from harm, to render aid, or even to protect property.17 Unfortunately,
the terms used to describe these situations vary, and this lack of
conformity leads to lower-court confusion on how to interpret
emergency situations.18 Regardless, most courts applying this doctrine
are addressing situations in which the police believe that they must
take warrantless action to protect people or property from imminent
harm.19 To maintain continuity in current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, lower courts must analyze 911 hang-ups under the
Supreme Court's search-and-seizure framework.20
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Brigham City v. Stuart21 and
Michigan v. Fisher,22 lay the foundation for analyzing emergency aid
17. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558-59 (2013):
A variety of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a
warrantless search, including law enforcement's need to provide emergency assistance
to an occupant of a home, engage in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect, or enter a burning
building to put out a fire and investigate its cause. As is relevant here, we have also
recognized that in some circumstances law enforcement officers may conduct a search
without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. While these
contexts do not necessarily involve equivalent dangers, in each a warrantless search is
potentially reasonable because "there is compelling need for official action and no time
to secure a warrant."
(citations omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)); see also John F. Decker,
Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 433, 441-44 (1999) (defining the emergency aid doctrine).
18. See Decker, supra note 17, at 441-48, 453-57. See generally State v. Vargas, 63 A.3d 175
(N.J. 2013) (discussing the differences between the emergency aid and community caretaking
doctrines, and noting the lower court's conflation of the two); Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police
Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1489-1511 (2009) (discussing the logical
underpinnings of the community caretaking doctrine and its proper application).
19. Some cases invoke the emergency aid doctrine. E.g., Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546,
549 (4th Cir. 2009) (suspicious activity); People v. Scott, No. A100429, 2003 WL 21363553, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App. June 12, 2003) (911 hang-up medical emergency); Davis v. City of Clarksdale, 18 So.
3d 246, 247, 250-51 (Miss. 2009) (finding, in civil suit, no reckless disregard in police investigation
of a 911 hang-up); Hannon v. State, 207 P.3d 344, 345 (Nev. 2009) (domestic dispute); Vargas, 63
A.3d at 177 (welfare check); State v. Frankel, 847 A.2d 561, 564 (N.J. 2004) (911 hang-up). Still
other cases invoke the community caretaking doctrine. E.g., People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 931 (Cal.
1999) (open door); In re Welfare of J.W.L., 732 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (911 hang-
up); State v. Bogan, 975 A.2d 377, 387 (N.J. 2009) (welfare check); State v. Myers, Nos. 9-02-65, 9-
02-66, 2003 WL 21321402, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2003) (endangered child); State v. Deneui,
775 N.W.2d 221, 227 (S.D. 2009) (ammonia leak); Cummings v. Lewis Co., 98 P.3d 822 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2004) (civil lawsuit for failure to respond to a 911 call).
20. That is, to the extent there is any continuity, it is critical to maintain the framework that
exists.
21. 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
22. 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009).
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situations. In both cases, the Court had to decide whether the police
could make a warrantless entry into a home when they believed
immediate action was necessary to provide aid or protect property.23
In Brigham, officers were notified of a loud, early morning
party.24 Upon arrival, they heard shouting and observed two teens
drinking in the backyard.25 They also observed, through windows and a
screen door, several adults attempting to restrain a teenager-who
eventually broke free and struck one of the adults.26 Having observed
minors drinking alcohol and an ongoing assault, the officers decided
that immediate action was necessary.27 They announced their presence,
entered the home, and gained control of the situation.28 Ultimately, they
charged the defendant, an adult in the home, with several minor
offenses.29 A Utah trial court, however, granted the defendant's motion
to suppress the warrantless entry on Fourth Amendment grounds, and
both the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed.30 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed, stating that the specific facts and circumstances cited by the
officers constituted an objectively reasonable basis to enter the home to
stop imminent harm.31
In Fisher, police officers responded to a neighborhood
disturbance. While investigating, officers observed a vehicle's smashed
windshield, broken windows on a nearby house, and blood on both the
vehicle and the door to the house.32 Through a window, officers observed
the defendant screaming and throwing objects.33 He had a laceration on
his hand, and he would not let officers enter his home.34 An officer did
enter, however, and the defendant pointed a firearm at him.35 The police
eventually arrested the defendant on weapons charges, but a Michigan
trial court suppressed the officer's warrantless entry because it believed
that the defendant's minor injuries failed to constitute an imminent
23. Id. at 47; Brigham, 547 U.S. at 403.
24. Brigham, 547 U.S. at 400.




29. Id. at 401, 407 (the charges included contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
disorderly conduct, and intoxication).
30. Id. at 401.
31. Id. at 407.
32. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 45-46 (2009) (per curiam).





emergency.36 An appeals court affirmed the decision, and the Michigan
Supreme Court denied leave to review.37 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed, again indicating that the specific
facts and circumstances cited by the officers constituted an objectively
reasonable basis to enter the home to prevent imminent harm.38
Both the Brigham and Fisher Courts framed their analyses by
first stating that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant
are presumptively unreasonable.39 However, Brigham acknowledged
that there may be compelling law enforcement needs that "obviat[e] the
requirement of a warrant . . . [in order] to assist persons who are
seriously injured or threatened with such injury."40 Likewise, Fisher
reaffirmed that "'the exigencies of the situation [may] make the needs
of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable.' "41 Both opinions reiterated that the "ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment" is reasonableness.42
While the Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes an
objectively reasonable basis n emergency situations, both Brigham and
Fisher relied on contemporaneous and particularized evidence. The
officers in Brigham observed an assault.43 In Fisher, the officers
observed damaged property, blood spatter, and injuries.44 Both opinions
explained that there were objectively reasonable bases for believing
that injured parties needed help because officers were confronted with
ongoing violence occurring within the home that they could see and
hear.45 Specific and articulable facts informed the officers' beliefs that
harm was imminent. Thus, the Court deemed the officers' interventions
necessary to quell ongoing emergencies with injured parties or the high
probability of additional injuries if the police failed to intervene.46
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 45, 46.
39. Id. at 47 (citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citing Groh, 540 U.S. at 559).
40. Brigham, 547 U.S. at 403 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978)).
41. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393-94).
42. Brigham, 547 U.S. at 403.
43. Id. at 401.
44. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 45-46.
45. Id. at 49 (additionally citing the need for officers to restore order, and the potential that
someone else inside the home was being assaulted but was not visible from the officers' vantage
point); Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406 (referencing nature of call, time, and specific observations such
as "thumping and crashing" and people yelling "stop, stop" and "get off me").
46. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 ("It sufficed to invoke the emergency aid exception that it was
reasonable to believe that Fisher had hurt himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treatment that
in his rage he was unable to provide, or that Fisher was about to hurt, or had already hurt, someone
else."); Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406:
926 [Vol. 68:3:919
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Finally, the Court held in both cases that it would not consider an
officer's subjective intent for conducting a search.4 7 Rather, it would
only consider an officer's pre-search factual and articulable
observations.48
The Court's holdings in Brigham and Fisher are not surprising.49
Despite the defendants' arguments that the injuries or actions in each
case did not justify warrantless entry, each case examined extant and
volatile situations with the potential to devolve into further harm
without police intervention. Thus, the officers' need to immediately
address ongoing or imminent harm was objectively reasonable and
sufficiently compelling to overcome the defendants' expectation of
privacy in their homes.
The Court would likely adhere to Brigham and Fisher's
established framework when analyzing future cases involving the
emergency aid doctrine. Thus, the Court prefers a warrant, but if the
officers did not obtain one, constitutionality will turn on whether the
warrantless search was reasonable.0 Furthermore, warrantless entries
under emergency circumstances will require the government to
establish that the police had an objectively reasonable basis to believe
that a situation required their immediate intervention to prevent
imminent harm.5 1 For the government to demonstrate this basis, the
police must cite contemporaneous and specific observations.52 Yet,
In these circumstances, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing
both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was
just beginning. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment required them to wait until another
blow rendered someone 'unconscious' or 'semi-conscious' or worse before entering. The
role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply
rendering first aid to casualties; an officer is not like a boxing (or hockey) referee, poised
to stop a bout only if it becomes too one-sided.
47. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47; Brigham, 547 U.S. at 404-05; see also United States v.
Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2000):
Creating a subjective standard would be a double-edged sword: while it might protect
some people from warrantless searches in those few instances where the police do not
really believe an injured person is in need of assistance, it would also open up the
possibility of warrantless searches anytime that police officers actually believed that an
exigency existed-regardless of the objective basis of that belief.
48. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47; Brigham, 547 U.S. at 404-05; Richardson, 208 F.3d at 630.
49. Brigham, 547 U.S. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("This is an odd flyspeck of a
case.. . . And the Court's unanimous opinion restating well-settled rules of federal law is so clearly
persuasive that it is hard to imagine the outcome was ever in doubt.").
50. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47; Brigham, 547 U.S. at 402.
51. Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406. In many ways, this standard is quite similar to the criminal
standard of probable cause. Yet, some argue that it is more similar to the criminal standard of
reasonable suspicion. This debate is outside the scope of this Note and, regardless, the distinction
is not necessary for its purposes as long as emergency aid situations are analyzed under the
standards outlined in Brigham and Fisher.
52. Id.; see also Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 ("[T]he test, as we have said, is not what [the officer]
believed, but whether there was 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical
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applying the standards articulated in Brigham and Fisher is
challenging when there is not an observable danger but rather a
presumption of danger based on the mere receipt of a 911 hang-up call.
C. How [Not] to Apply Brigham and Fisher
In the context of 911 hang-ups, some lower courts inexplicably
abandon the framework articulated in Brigham and Fisher.
Presumably, a 911 hang-up from within a residence without any
observable or articulable facts would fail the test applied in Fisher and
Brigham. Yet, despite the lack of auditory or visual evidence indicating
that something is amiss, police officers regularly enter homes without
warrants or specific and articulable facts indicating an ongoing
emergency.53 They enter based on a presumption that 911 hang-ups
demonstrate the existence of an ongoing emergency and the threat of
imminent harm.54 Some police departments not only adopt these
searches as common practice but as department policy and procedure.55
And many courts subscribe to this reasoning by holding that a 911
hang-up, by itself or followed by an unanswered callback, constitutes
an objectively reasonable basis to make a warrantless entry into a
home.56
assistance was needed, or persons were in danger." (quoting Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406; Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978))); United States v. Espinoza, 403 F. App'x 239, 241 (9th Cir.
2010) (referring to Fisher and noting "[wie do not read that fact-specific opinion to hold broadly
that warrantless entry into a home is always justified where the police cannot confirm that there
are no injured victims inside a house").
53. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 56.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Sioux FALLS POLICE DEP'T, POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL POLICY # 1521,
911 HANGUPS (2009), available at http://www.siouxfalls.org/-/media/Documents/police/policy-
manual/1500_misc.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/78MX-HVBQ; TRURO POLICE DEP'T, E-911
HANGUP RESPONSE 2 (Oct. 25, 2002), available at http://www.truropolice.org/
On%2OLine%2OManuals/E911%2OHangup%2OResponse.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W82B-
AG5P; Zak Failla & Robert Michelin, 911 Hang- Ups Are No Joke For Scarsdale Police, SCARSDALE
DAILY VOICE, Aug. 6, 2012, http://scarsdale.dailyvoice.comlpolice-fire/911-hang-ups-are-no-joke-
scarsdale-police, archived at http://perma.cc/7QZK-WWZK; Dave Goldberg, Eagle Scout Project
Explains Dangers of False 911 Alarms, SENTINEL, Dec. 27, 2001, http://ns.gmnews.com/news/2001-
12-27/FRONTPage/010.html, archived at http://perma.cc/44NB-UD7P; Marty Kasper, 911 Hang-
ups Waste Police Resources, MY STATELINE (Nov. 12, 2012, 9:27 PM), http://
www.mystateline.com/story/911-hang-ups-waste-police-resources/d/story/H-sb2ZAYzkuBjNO6cB
Yh2w, archived at http://perma.cclAH4E-U68J; Jonathan D. Silver et al., Pittsburgh Police
Formalize Policy on 'Unknown Trouble,' 911 Hang-up Calls, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 29,
2013, http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2013/05/29/Pittsburgh-police-formalize-policy-on-
unknown-trouble-911-hang-up-calls/stories/ 2013052901220000000#ixzz2sqytvHdV, archived at
http://perma.cc/N75G-J7QG; see also People v. Greene, 682 N.E.2d 354, 356-57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
(discussing testimony regarding the sheriffs policy to enter homes after receiving 911 hang-ups).
56. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Memphis, 617 F.3d 864, 869 (6th Cir. 2010) (911 hang-up,
open door); Hanson v. Dane Cnty., Wis., 608 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2010):
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In Hanson v. Dane County, police responded to a 911 hang-up
when operators were unable to reach anyone after returning the call.57
Upon arrival, officers entered an open garage without consent and
spoke to Hanson, who was standing inside.5 8 Hanson said that there
was no emergency and that no one needed assistance.5 9 Nevertheless,
to ensure the safety of any occupants, officers entered Hanson's home
without his consent.60 Although no one inside was injured or in need of
[We think that a 911 call provides probable cause for entry, if a call back goes
unanswered. The 911 line is supposed to be used for emergencies only. A lack of an
answer on the return of an incomplete emergency call implies that the caller is unable
to pick up the phone-because of injury, illness (a heart attack, for example), or a threat
of violence.
Nail v. Gutierrez, 339 F. App'x 630, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that a 911 hang-up call, on its own,
"gave the officers all the exigent circumstances they needed" to conduct a warrantless entry);
United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding a 911 hang-up followed by
two subsequent hang-ups justified entry onto property for "knock and talk"); United States v.
Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 719-20 (10th Cir. 2006) (911 hang-up followed by a refusal to allow officers
to enter); United States v. Obbanya, No. C 11-677 CW, 2012 WL 851129, at *1-4 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
13, 2012) (911 hang-up and refusal to answer questions); United States v. Robbins, No. CR11-0014,
2011 WL 1317280, at *5-6 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 5, 2011) (opining that a 911 hang-up with busy signal
justified intrusion onto curtilage); Clark ex rel T.M.J. v. Pielert, Civil No. 07-3649(DSD/JJG), 2009
WL 35337, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2009) (911 hang-up and refusal to allow entry); United States
v. Huang, No. CR-06-00487 DLJ, 2008 WL 360546, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008) (discussing a 911
static disconnect and noting that "once the police have been summoned via a 911 call, it is
incumbent on them to assure that their assistance is not truly needed"); United States v. Parker,
No. CR 05-0505-PHX-NVW, 2006 WL 163562 at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 20, 2006) ("[A] 911 call itself is a
call for assistance or protection in an emergency."); State v. Pearson-Anderson, 41 P.3d 275, 278
(Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (saying that a 911 hang-up constituted implied consent to conduct a limited,
warrantless search); People v. Greene, 682 N.E.2d 354, 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (involving a 911
hang-up and officer's observation that an occupant hid something under a couch cushion); In re
Welfare of J.W.L., 732 N.W.2d 332, 335-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (justifying a warrantless search
after 911 hang-up and open door); State v. Frankel, 847 A.2d 561, 571 (N.J. 2003) ("An open line
9-1-1 call, by its very nature, may fairly be considered an SOS call, a presumptive emergency,
requiring an immediate response."); State v. Hodge, No. 23964, 2011 WL 486516, at *6 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 11, 2011) (validating a warrantless search after receiving a 911 hang-up, finding an open
front door, and seeing a television playing in the background); State v. May, No. 06CA10, 2007 WL
914871, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2007) ("[Tlhe 911 hang-up calls created sufficient exigent
circumstances to impose a duty on police to investigate whether someone at the residence needed
assistance and further negated any privilege on appellant's part to resist entry into the premises.");
State v. Myers, Nos. 9-02-65, 9-02-66, 2003 WL 21321402, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2003)
(validating a warrantless search after receiving a 911 hang-up and observing through a window
that a television set was on and "refus[ing] to base the reasonableness of a warrantless entry into
a home from which a 911 call has originated, and the nature of which is unknown, on the
percentage of these types of calls that are non-emergencies in nature" because the court "find[s]
these types of calls to inherently be emergencies"); State v. Nelson, 823 N.W.2d 841, 841 $ 8, (Wis.
Ct. App. 2012) (unpublished table decision) (holding that 911 hang-up provided reasonable
suspicion to conduct a vehicle stop).





assistance, the officers, nearly an hour later, arrested Hanson for
domestic abuse after he admitted he "bumped" into his wife during an
argument.61 The State later dropped the charges, and Hanson brought
a civil 1983 claim6 2 against the officers for violating his constitutional
rights.63
On motion for summary judgment, the defendants contended
that a warrantless entry was permissible based on their receipt of a 911
hang-up and an unanswered return call, which they believed amounted
to exigent circumstances.64 The court agreed: "By itself, a 911 call may
be enough to support a warrantless search under the exigent
circumstances exception" because it suggests that someone is "injured
or otherwise incapacitated."65 The court then held that the 911 hang-up
call in conjunction with the operator's unanswered return call made it
reasonable for the officers to believe that immediate assistance was
necessary.66 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that "a 911 call
provides probable cause for entry, if a [return] call goes unanswered."67
Additionally, the court depended on its finding that the officers already
established probable cause to be inside the home-probable cause that
was based on the mere receipt of a 911 hang-up-to justify the officers'
subsequent reentries into the home, interviews, and refusal to leave.68
Furthermore, warrantless entries may be permissible even
when officers fail to contact anyone on scene. In State v. Hodge, like in
Hanson, operators dispatched police after receiving a 911 hang-up
followed by an unanswered callback.69 The investigating officer
approached the house and observed a closed outer screen door but an
ajar inner door.70 A television was on, but unlike in Hanson, no one
answered when the officer yelled into the residence.71 Based on these
61. Id.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (permitting civil suits against government officials for their
violation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights).
63. Hanson, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1051-52.
64. See id. at 1053. Exigent circumstances are those situations in which the police must
respond immediately, and such circumstances may obviate the need for a warrant. See supra note
17.
65. Hanson, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (citing United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 630
(7th Cir. 2000)).
66. Id. at 1053-54.
67. Hanson v. Dane Cnty., Wis., 608 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2010).
68. Id. at 338. What constitutes probable cause varies depending on the crime alleged and
the facts involved. Yet, a 911 hang-up may be a medical emergency, a criminal emergency, or no
emergency whatsoever. It is unclear in Hanson for what crime or emergency the 911 hang-up
established probable cause.
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benign observations, the officer entered and searched the home, which
was vacant.72 During the search, the officer uncovered pill bottles,
baggies with white powder, and money laying on a bed.73 Shortly
thereafter, the tenant, Hodge, returned and explained that a neighbor
asked to use his phone to report a fire at the neighbor's apartment.74
The neighbor began to call but changed her mind and instead asked
Hodge for help.75 He helped extinguish the fire and returned to find a
police officer waiting at his home.76 Officers eventually arrested Hodge
on narcotics and other charges.77
Hodge's primary defense was that the 911 hang-up was
insufficient to justify the officer's warrantless entry into his home.78 He
argued that for the officer to have an objectively reasonable basis to
enter his home, she needed more than a subjective belief that someone
possibly needed aid.7 9 Instead, Hodge argued there must have been a
"real and immediate necessity to enter" his home.s0 Furthermore, the
fact that Hodge did not respond when the officer yelled through the
screen door was insufficient, together with the 911 hang-up and
unanswered return call, to indicate an imminent emergency., The
court disagreed, stating that "the 911 hang-up created a reasonable
belief that an emergency existed, requiring investigation by law
enforcement officers [because] 'we find these types of calls [i.e., 911
hang-up calls] to inherently be emergencies. In fact, the emergency of
these situations only ceases once the emergency responder is able to
ascertain whether someone is in need of aid.' "82 While the majority
failed to mention the Supreme Court's decisions in Brigham and Fisher,
the dissent recognized that Brigham and Fisher prohibited a search
based on mere suspicion and in the absence of "some other positive
indication that an occupant of the premises may actually be in need of
immediate aid .... "83
As these cases illustrate, within some jurisdictions, 911 hang-
ups for which callbacks go unanswered are sufficient evidence of an





77. Id. at *11.
78. Id. at *4.
79. Id.
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id. at *4--5 (citing State v. Myers, Nos. 9-02-65, 9-02-66, 2003 WL 21321402, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 10, 2003)).
83. Id. at *12 (Grady, Presiding J., dissenting).
2015] 931
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ongoing emergency. As discussed in Part III, however, the differences
between the facts and holdings of Brigham and Fisher on the one hand
and the very nature of 911 hang-ups on the other casts doubt on that
assumption.
III. THE 411 ON 911: RESPONDING TO 911 CALLS IN THE ERA OF
RAPIDLY EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY
Police responses to 911 hang-ups involve competing interests:
while the Fourth Amendment limits the circumstances in which the
government may invade a home, individuals have strong expectations
of receiving help when calling 911. The key question, therefore, is
whether 911 hang-ups convey sufficient information to overcome
Fourth Amendment protection. In fact, 911 hang-ups may convey little
or no information regarding a caller's identity, location, or reason for
the call. Consequently, 911 hang-ups alone do not justify warrantless
searches due to their lack of any indices that an actual emergency
exists.
A. Technological Limitations
The various means of communicating emergencies present
challenges for the emergency services system. Americans make nearly
240 million 911 calls through wired and wireless phones each year,84
and other means of emergency communication, such as Internet-based
and text-message reporting, are rapidly developing.85 Unfortunately,
emerging technologies are often incompatible with older 911
infrastructures.86 The problem is further complicated by a lack of
84. 9-1-1 Statistics, NAT'L EMERGENCY No. Ass'N, http://www.nena.org/?page=911 Statistics,
archived at http://perma.cc/QG6C-RXVL (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
85. See Ann Marie Squeo, Cellphone Hangup: When You Dial 911, Can Help Find You?,
WALL ST. J., (May 12, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB111584956319131012; NAT'L EMERGENCY No. ASS'N, NENA INFORMATION DOCUMENT FOR
HANDLING TEXT-TO-9-1-1 IN THE PSAP 5-15 (Oct. 9, 2013), available at https://c.ymcdn.com/
sites/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/Standards/NENA-INF-007.1-2013_TextLMes.pdf, archived
at https://perma.cc/7764-WGTA (discussing the prevalence of texting as a primary means of
communication and the need for technological and procedural mechanisms to accommodate this
developing trend).
86. See NAT'L EMERGENCY NO. ASS'N, supra note 85 (explaining that the 911 and E911
systems were never meant to handle nonvoice communications); see also James E. Holloway et al.,
Regulation and Public Policy in the Full Deployment of the Enhanced Emergency Call System (E-
911) and Their Influence on Wireless Cellular and Other Technologies, 12 B.U. J. SCi. & TECH. L.
93, 101 (2006) ("The implementation of wireless E-911 emergency systems is complicated by
wireless carriers' use of different technologies.... Consequently, LECs and PSAPs need different
software, relays, and routers to handle each type of wireless technology, thus making
implementation of E-911 slower and more costly than expected.").
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uniformity in 911 technologies.87 Because not every area can afford to
upgrade to the newest and most capable technologies, 911 capabilities
vary greatly among different municipalities.8 8 There are currently four
main types of 911 services: Basic 911, Enhanced 911 ("E911"), Wireless
Phase I, and Wireless Phase 11.89
Basic 911 and E911 systems manage all wired calls (i.e., calls
along physical telephone lines) but do not handle those from cell phones
or over the Internet. Basic 911 systems do not have the ability to obtain
the caller's identity or location;90 thus, an operator must gain this
information by speaking directly to the caller.91 This process is not
necessary with E911 systems. The E911 system employs sophisticated
computer systems that are capable of recognizing the origin of a call,
thereby providing the operator with the caller's telephone number and
location.92
The process for obtaining wireless information is less
streamlined.93 There are two types of dedicated wireless systems, Phase
I and Phase II. Phase I wireless systems find a 911 caller by cross-
referencing a caller's phone number with information that wireless
carriers are legally obligated to provide to 911 call centers upon
request.94 Since this information often consists of just a telephone
number and the registered location of the cell site or base station
transmitting the call, the information is commonly stale.95 Phase II
87. Throughout most of the United States, dialing 911 will start a process in which one of
over six thousand centrally located routing centers directs a call to the appropriate emergency
services center. See NAT'L EMERGENCY No. ASS'N, supra note 85 (noting that as of November 2014,
the United States had 5,926 primary and secondary Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs)); see
also Holloway et al., supra note 86, at 98-99 (discussing 911 technology and arguing that the lack
of uniformity of 911 services on the state level inhibits federal policy).
88. See NAT'L EMERGENCY NO. ASS'N, supra note 85.
89. Darren Handler, An Island of Chaos Surrounded by a Sea of Confusion: The E911
Wireless Device Location Initiative, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH, Winter 2005, at 8.
90. See Cell Phones and 9-1-1, NAT'L EMERGENCY NO. AsS'N, http://www.nena.org/
?page=911Cellphones, archived at http://perma.cc/89H4-LA28 (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
91. Holloway et al., supra note 86, at 99.
92. Handler, supra note 89, at 11 (describing Automatic Number Identification ("ANI")
capabilities); Holloway et al., supra note 86, at 98. Essentially, the system recognizes and routes
calls based on the ANI and Automatic Location Identification ("ALI"), or caller-ID. Thus, a call
made from City X is automatically routed to an emergency service dispatcher in City X's
jurisdiction.
93. Wireless callers account for nearly one-third or eighty million of all 911 calls made each
year. See 9-1-1 Statistics, supra note 84. Yet, many centrally located routing centers are unable to
recognize wireless number identifiers, thus requiring an operator to question the caller in order to
correctly route the call.
94. Handler, supra note 89, at 16.
95. See FCC Enhanced 9-1-1 - Wireless Services, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedialenhanced-
9-1-1-wireless-services, archived at http://perma.cc/6UFQ-SNL4 (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
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services collect real-time data from a cell phone's GPS locator, if the
caller's phone is so equipped, or by triangulation.9 6 Triangulation and
GPS locators allow operators to direct officers to a caller's approximate
locale even if the caller is unable to communicate.97
Finding a specific caller, however, is nonetheless difficult in
highly populated, urban environments where houses are close together
or in a multifamily housing unit. Due to this limitation, an operator
may attempt to corroborate a GPS or triangulated location with the
information provided by the service provider.98 If the real-time
information is in close proximity to a caller's physical address,
emergency services can confidently respond directly to that address.99
If real-time data does not correspond to a physical address, call centers
often direct officers to the landmarks, buildings, or intersections closest
to the call's origin.100 From there, an officer's only recourse is a door-to-
door and person-to-person inquiry into whether anyone knows of an
ongoing problem.
The inability to locate a caller is particularly acute with
emerging means of calling 911, such as Internet-based phone
services.101 Much of the difficulty is due to an inability to route an
96. Handler, supra note 89, at 17-18; Holloway et al., supra note 86, at 103-05.
97. The GPS method can yield a caller's location within fifty to one hundred feet. The
triangulation method is accurate within one hundred to three hundred feet. See Handler, supra
note 89, at 20-21 (describing FCC mandates regarding the accuracy of each method).
98. Additionally, it has been the author's experience that police and emergency services
databases, the Internet, public records, and phone listings are often used to corroborate a name or
GPS or triangulated location with a physical address. See NAT'L EMERGENCY No. ASS'N, SILENT
OR HANG-UP 9-1-1 CALLS FOR SERVICE at 19 (Aug. 23, 2002), available at http://
www.nena.org/resource/collection/ABEAA8F5-82F4-4531-AE4A-0AC5B2774E72/NENA_56-
501_Silent-orHang-Up_9-1-1_Calls.pdf, archived at http://perma.cclH66X-7WT5 (suggesting
that call centers integrate information sources to increase their ability to locate callers).
99. Officers often check real-time locations first and then check the surrounding area and
past addresses if the initial response was fruitless. See Walker v. Jackson, 952 F. Supp. 2d 343,
346 (D. Mass. 2013) (noting that officers responded to both a claimed, given address and the caller's
actual address determined through a trace).
100. See id.
101. NAT'L EMERGENCY No. ASS'N, NENA TECHNICAL INFORMATION DOCUMENT ON NETWORK
INTERFACES FOR E9-1-1 AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES at 4-4 to 4-6 (Sept. 11, 2002),
available at https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.nena.org/resource/collection/9lEO3A3A-B334-4EB6-
9205-E25BBF6AF8E7/NENA_- 07-503-vlNetworkInterfacesfor_9-1-1_andEmerging-Technolo
gies.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B9SM-7WEL (noting that emerging methods of contacting 911
include VolP, inter-exchange replacement, local exchange replacement, enterprise networks, cable
TV/telephony, Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") and VoIP-enabled E9-1-1 call handling equipment);
see also Andrea W.M. Louie, Imposing Geographical "Locateability" for Voice Over Internet
Protocol, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 655, 655-57 (2007) (discussing VoIP and its lack of"locateability"
within the 911 system); Shawn Young, Internet Calling's Downside: Failing to Link Callers to 911,
WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.cominews/articles/
SB111585619278031205:
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Internet communication through existing emergency services
technology,102 as well as the system's inability to identify Internet-based
users.103 Thus, an Internet-based 911 call may not be routed to the
caller's jurisdiction, and the call center may not be able to identify the
caller.104 In these situations, direct communication may be necessary to
determine the caller's true location and identity. Additionally, some
Internet service providers do not allow users to connect to 911, or they
route 911 calls to nonemergency numbers.105
In sum, 911 technology varies across jurisdictions. Although
wired phone lines almost uniformly provide E911 call centers with
critical information-the caller's number and registered address-not
all service centers are equipped with E911 systems. Additionally,
Americans are increasingly relying on cell phones.106 Almost one-third
of the estimated 240 million 911 calls made each year are completed via
cell phone.107 And only 41 percent of call centers are equipped to locate
wireless callers.08 Thus, for the majority of call centers, if a cell phone
user called 911 and hung up without communicating any information,
the only data available, if any, was the caller's approximate location
and telephone number. The problem is growing as cell phone and
Internet-based services increase in popularity faster than emergency
services centers can update their systems.109
Calls from these services sometimes ring at general or administrative numbers at
emergency-call centers instead of connecting directly to 911 operators. In some places,
those general numbers aren't staffed after normal business hours. Even when the calls
are answered, the person on the other end may not be a trained emergency operator
and can't see the caller's address automatically.
102. See, e.g., Squeo, supra note 85.
103. NAT'L EMERGENCY No. Ass'N, supra note 101 at 4-4 to 4-6; Young, supra note 101. For
example, some service providers allow internet-based users to choose their phone's area code
regardless of where they live, so calls placed in one state may list an area code belonging to
another. See id.
104. NAT'L EMERGENCY NO. ASS'N, supra note 101 at 4-4 to 4-6; Young, supra note 101.
105. See Squeo, supra note 85. Nonemergency numbers may not automatically identify the
user's phone number or pertinent information. Thus, gaining this information from a restricted or
blocked number may require direct communication.
106. Nearly ninety percent of all homes use wireless service, of which fifty-four percent
primarily rely on wireless services. The percentage is rapidly increasing. See Wireless Quick Facts,
CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/wireless-quick-facts, archived at
http://perma.cc/85UG-G3QT (last visited Mar. 6, 2015); Squeo, supra note 85 ("Virtually all of the
nation's 6,000 call centers can locate land-line phones, but only 41% of them can locate cell
phones. . . .").
107. 9-1-1 Statistics, supra note 84.
108. Wireless Quick Facts, supra note 106.
109. Julie Crothers, 911 Hang-up Calls Plague Police, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.) (Mar. 3,
2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.fortwayne.com/apps/pbes.dlllarticle?AID=/20130303/NEWS/
320133884/-1/NEWS05, archived at http://perma.cc/CVQ5-VE5E (police noted that three-fourths
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B. Can You Know What You Don't Know?
The uncertainty regarding the reason for a particular call
compounds the technological problems identified above. Evidence
suggests that most 911 calls do not require immediate responses to save
lives or property.110 Citizens frequently call for nonemergency reasons
such as juvenile delinquency, late reports of larcenies and vandalisms,
gang graffiti, noninjury accidents, and benign questions."' Moreover,
many 911 calls are simply inadvertent or ambiguous.112 These types of
calls saturate phone lines dedicated to handling emergency calls and
ultimately threaten the efficiency of the emergency services system.113
1. Illegitimate and Ambiguous 911 Calls
Open-line 911 calls, which cell phone users frequently make,
occur when an individual dials 911 and the line remains open but no
one responds. The operator will listen closely for background noises and
dispatch the call accordingly. By contrast, electronic malfunctions,
of all 911 calls in 2005 were from landlines, but seventy-seven percent of all 911 calls in 2012 were
from cellphones); Squeo, supra note 85.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 481 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2007) ("A citizen may call
911 in order to report an emergency, be it criminal activity, a fire, or a medical emergency, but
someone may also call 911 because he or she misdialed another number, accidentally activated a
speed dial feature, or wished to pull a prank on the authorities."); NAT'L EMERGENCY NO. ASS'N,
GUIDELINES FOR MINIMUM RESPONSE TO WIRELESS 9-1-1 CALLS 8-15 (Nov. 18, 2004), available at
http://c.ymedn.com/sites/www.nena.org/resource/collection/ABEAA8F5-82F4-4531-AE4A-
OAC5B2774E72/NENA_56-001MinimumResponseWireless 911_Calls.pdfhhSearchTerms=
%2256-001%22, archived at http://perma.cc/VN29-6HES (discussing response requirements for
911 calls); see also infra notes 112, 113.
111. 100 Ways to Mis-dial 911, DISPATCH MAG. ON-LINE, http://www.911dispatch.com/
911/911_misdials, archived at http://perma.cc[PR6V-3REV (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
112. See, e.g., WINBOURNE CONSULTING, LLC, CITY OF NEW YORK, 9-1-1 CALL PROCESSING
REVIEW (911CPR) 11 (May 1, 2012), available at http://pdf.911dispatch.com.s3.amazonaws.com/
nyc 911_reportmay2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T8RF-Y8WB (citing over four million
inadvertent calls received in New York City in 2010, half a million more than legitimate calls
requiring a police response during the same period).
113. See Accidental 911 Calls From Wireless Phones Pose Risk to Public Safety, FCC (Oct. 29,
2014), available at http://www.fcc.gov/guides/accidental-911-calls-wireless-phones, archived at
http://perma.cc/Y8YL-NNLD (discussing the dangers posed by accidental 911 calls); 9-1-1 INDUS.
ALLIANCE, THE OVERLOADED 9-1-1 SYSTEM 7-27 (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://
www.theindustrycouncil.org/publications/overloaded9-1-1system.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
EDC3-LSVP (discussing case studies from across the nation regarding nonemergency use of 911);
see also Erin Maloney, Tampa Police Launch Campaign to Cut Down on Needless 911 Calls, BAY
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2014, 4:46 PM), http://www.baynews9.com/content/news/baynews9/news/
article.html/content/news/articles/bn9/2014/2/17/tampapolice launch_ .html, archived at http://
perma.cc/J9EV-K7HE ("The Tampa Police Department says more than half of the people who call
9-1-1 in the city don't have an emergency at all, so officials have launched a new social media
campaign to get the word out about how not to call 9-1-1."); 100 Ways to Mis-dial 911, supra note
111 (highlighting the many encumbrances on the 911 response system).
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damaged equipment, and lightning strikes frequently cause static 911
calls.114 These malfunctions initiate a callerless 911 call resulting in an
operator hearing only static. Unfortunately, the police respond to many
of these calls for fear there is an actual emergency, thus straining
already-scarce police resources.
The larger problem plaguing emergency services is the 911
hang-up call. These calls are particularly troublesome because of their
frequency and how little information they convey.115 After receiving a
hang-up call, dispatchers usually call the number back, if possible, and
attempt to speak to the caller.116 If this attempt is unsuccessful, law
enforcement often investigates, even though the origin of the hang-up
call may be ambiguous.117 Even if someone answers the return call, law
enforcement may be dispatched if the dispatcher receives an
unsatisfactory explanation."" Additionally, some police departments
respond whether the caller provides an explanation or not.'19 The usual
explanations for hang-ups include misdials, inadvertent calls (pocket-
dials), children playing with the phone, cell phone malfunctions,
pranks, a change in circumstances, and glitches.120 In fact, hang-up
calls are so common that the Federal Communications Commission
cites unintentional calls, including hang-up calls, as posing a risk to
public safety.121
The scope of the problem is staggering. Nationwide, callers
accidently made over eighty million wired and wireless 911 calls in the
114. See United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2011) (saying that a static
911 call is insufficient to form a reasonable basis for a warrantless search).
115. Since the public expects the police to respond when summoned, police departments may
fear that a failure to thoroughly investigate 911 hang-ups will expose officers or departments to
liability. See SILENT OR HANG-UP 9-1-1 CALLS FOR SERVICE, supra note 98, at 13.
116. See NAT'L EMERGENCY NO. ASS'N, supra note 110 (noting the standard procedure for 911
operators who receive hang-up calls).
117. See, e.g., Sioux FALLS POLICE DEP'T, supra note 55; see also Failla & Michelin, supra note
55 ("If there is no response to a call back, officers are sent to the location to ensure everyone's
safety."); Goldberg, supra note 55 ("In 2000, the North Brunswick Police Department responded to
1,814 911 calls and only 165 of them were valid."); Kasper, supra note 55; ("Anytime an emergency
call center gets a 911 hang-up, [police] have to send two officers to the residence or business to
make sure it's not an emergency.").
118. See NAT'L EMERGENCY No. AsS'N, supra note 110, at 8-15.
119. Id.
120. See RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE No.
19: MISUSE AND ABUSE OF 911, at 2-7 (Aug. 22, 2002), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
Publications/e07042423_web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9JRY-4GDA (explaining the scope of
the 911 problem, its impact on services, and proper police responses-and opining that a
homeowner's refusal to allow police to enter the home when investigating a 911 hang-up, absent
more, is unlikely sufficient justification for a warrantless search).
121. See Accidental 911 Calls from Wireless Phones Pose Risk to Public Safety, supra note 113.
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year 2011 alone.122 The problem affects small and large cities alike.123
For example, the Valley Emergency Communications Center in West
Valley City, Utah, fielded three hundred thousand emergency calls from
September 2011 to October 2012.124 A total of 116,243 were 911 hang-
ups, 12 5 and valid emergencies constituted a staggeringly low one
percent of those calls.26 Likewise, the Virginia Beach Emergency
Communications Center estimates that ninety-nine percent of all 911
wireless calls it received were accidental, and less than one percent
turned out to be valid emergencies.127 New York City alone fielded
nearly four million accidental 911 calls in the year 2010.128
122. See Katherine Bindley, Butt Dials Overwhelm 911 Call Centers: Report, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 10, 2012, 2:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/10/butt-dialing-
overwhelming-911-call-centers-_n_1954420.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PFS5-T57J; Erin
Hong, Pocket-Dialing Creating Headaches at 911 Call Centers Across the Nation, DESERET NEWS
(Oct. 26, 2012, 6:31 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865565400/Pocket-dialing-creating-
headaches-at-911-call-centers-across-the-nation.html, archived at http://perma.ccY4V8-CWMB.
123. One small Midwest call center fielded nearly eighty-six thousand incoming 911 calls in
2012. See METRO COMMC'NS AGENCY, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2013), available at http://
www.911 metro.org/documents/annual%20reports/2012-Annualreport.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/9FQP-TFD2. Hang-ups accounted for 10,733 of these calls, just 318 less than the most
common type of call to which officers responded: disorderly subjects. Id. at 8.
124. See Pat Reavy, 'Pocket Dialing' Has Consequences for 911 Dispatchers, Police, DESERET
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865565402/Pocket-dialing-




From Sept. 1, 2011, to Oct. 1, 2012, VECC received 301,730 calls to 911. More than
245,000 - or more than 80 percent of those calls - were made from cellphones. Of those
cellphone calls, 116,243 came in as '911 hangup,' meaning a dispatcher did not
immediately talk to the person making the call. From that number: 95,752 were calls
the either an offer responded to that turned out to be a false alarm or the caller had a
phone that dispatchers could not pinpoint a location; 19,270 were 911 hangups that the
dispatcher was able to call the person back and verify a false alarm; 430 were calls made
on deactivated cellphones that dispatcher could not call back or trace. Old cellphones
that are deactivated still have the ability to call 911, but they cannot receive calls.
127. See VB Call Center Reporting High Number of Accidental 911 Calls (WAVY TV Oct. 16,
2012), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BpostKul4-g; see also United States v.
Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing trial testimony that approximately half of
all hang-up calls were not emergencies); Crothers, supra note 109 (noting that "[d]ispatchers
responded to 23,936 hang-up calls," and that "[alccording to the Fort Wayne Police Department,
911 hang-up calls are the second most frequent calls for service in the county," and that "[r]eal
emergencies makeup less than 10 percent of all 911 hang-up calls").
128. See WINBOURNE CONSULTING, LLC, supra note 112, at 11; NYC Mayor Releases 911
Report Critical of System, DISPATCH MAG. ON-LINE (May 7, 2012), http://www.911dispatch.com/
2012/05/07/nyc-mayor-releases-911-report-critical-of-system/, archived at http://perma.ccl9C6D-
5BYW.
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2. Determining Caller Identity and Police Responses
Nine-one-one misuse is rampant, and the inherent limitations of
the 911 system also result in significant and substantive problems.
Should officers respond in the first place, to where, and what is the
nature of the caller's need? A police response first requires knowing
where the call originated. As discussed above, some 911 calls yield no
location or caller identity, thereby making a police response impossible.
And while most wired calls yield an address to which the police can
respond, such calls generally constitute a minority of calls received, and
their frequency will likely decrease as cell phone use increases.12 9
Determining the location of wireless callers is more challenging because
when a cell phone does transmit location information, operators often
need to cross-reference the telephone number, the name associated with
the number, or the phone's GPS or triangulated location with call center
databases to ascertain a physical address.130 When a GPS or
triangulated location is known, operators dispatch officers to that
location or to a nearby address associated with the phone number.131 If
the phone did not transmit a location, but the phone number is
associated with a known address or a specific person, officers may be
sent to that location even though a cell phone owner could be using that
phone anywhere.132
Furthermore, even if a location is known, officers responding to
911 hang-ups do not know who called or why. The usual response,
therefore, is to observe the location for problems.133 This includes
129. See, e.g., Kasper, supra note 55; 9-1-1 Statistics, supra note 84.
130. See Walker v. Jackson, 952 F. Supp. 2d 343, 346 (D. Mass. 2013) (involving officers who
responded to both a given address and the caller's actual address determined through a trace). The
information conveyed in a hang-up call depends on whether a call center can interpret Phase I or
Phase II calls or if the caller's phone has Phase I or Phase II capabilities. Handler, s upra note 89,
at 16; see also supra note 98.
131. See sources cited supra note 130.
132. See NAT'L EMERGENCY No. ASS'N, supra note 98, at 16-18 (describing standard operating
procedures and best practices for operators receiving 911 hang-ups).
133. E.g., TRURO POLICE DEP'T, supra note 55:
If no contact is made with the caller, an officer will be sent to the caller location. Officers
should use common sense, and evaluate and consider the following conditions prior to
making entry:
1. Visually inspect the premises to see if there are any signs of a break
2. Do they hear/see anything unusual emanating from within
3. Attempt to obtain any information from the neighbors
4. Are the police aware of any past problems at that address
Silver et al., supra note 55 (describing steps for officers responding to unknown trouble calls,
including checking for signs of a struggle, verifying whether a callback was attempted, knocking
on the door, calling and listening for a ringing phone from within the residence, and talking to
neighbors).
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looking for open doors and windows, noting unusual sights and sounds,
and attempting to contact occupants. If no one answers, officers often
conclude with a perimeter inspection.134 Persistent officers continue to
knock, call inside, speak to neighbors, and check databases for alternate
phone numbers, other means of contact, and any previous call history
at that location.35 At that point, if officers still lack a reason to believe
anything is out of the ordinary, they have exhausted most of their
nonintrusive means to ascertain the validity of the call. Notably,
officers customarily use these less intrusive means before resorting to
a warrantless entry.136 Doing so reflects the sensitive nature of a home
intrusion and the lack of information available to otherwise justify an
immediate entry.137 Once nonintrusive techniques have been
exhausted, the question remains whether the police should continue the
investigation through more invasive means.
How departments allow their officers to act under such
circumstances varies. Some departments simply do not respond to 911
hang-ups unless there is clear evidence of trouble.138 Others direct their
officers to stop investigating if they fail to observe anything unusual. 139
Some departments, however, not only authorize but also require
entering homes to ensure that no one needs emergency assistance.140
For instance, one department's policy and procedure manual states the
134. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (noting that officers do not violate the
law by knocking at the door when attempting to contact those within when the average citizen
may do the same).
135. This procedure is commonplace, including at the Sioux Falls, South Dakota police
department. SIOUX FALLS POLICE DEP'T, supra note 55.
136. This practice is taught in training and reinforced through custom. See id.; TRURO POLICE
DEP'T, supra note 55, at 2.
137. Yet, the Court has repeatedly held that police do not need to employ the least intrusive
measures. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) ("[TJhis Court has repeatedly stated
that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require employing the least intrusive
means . . . ."); People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 938 (Cal. 1999) ("The fact officers could have done
something more before entering is not dispositive .... ). But see State v. Reynolds, 197 P.3d 327,
332 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008) (holding that officers should have used less intrusive means before
conducting a warrantless entry into a home).
138. See SAMPSON, supra note 120, at 19-20.
139. Id.
140. See Hanson v. Dane Cnty., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2009) ("policy to
personally check on everyone in the house"); United States v. Obbanya, No. C 11-677 CW, 2012
WL 851129, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012) (policy to ensure that no one needs help); United States
v. Huang, No. CR-06-00487 DLJ, 2008 WL 360546, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008) (policy to check
the welfare of occupants); United States v. Meixner, No. 00-CR-20025-BC, 2000 WL 1597736 at *4
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2000) (routine to check residence regardless of whether 911 call was
accidental); State v. Pearson-Anderson, 41 P.3d 275, 278 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (policy to enter and
search homes incident to 911 hang-up); SIOUX FALLS POLICE DEP'T, supra note 55 (detailing
department policy in response to inadvertent 911 calls); TRURO POLICE DEP'T, supra note 55, at 2
(discussing response protocol for 911 hang-up calls).
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following: "If contact is made [with an occupant], the officers will
perform a cursory search of the residence or business for any injured or
distressed persons. Officers should also be looking for any outward
signs of a struggle or other criminal activity." 141 The department's
manual also addresses situations where officers do not make contact
with an occupant: "If officers fail to establish phone contact with
someone inside the location, they will contact a supervisor for
permission to enter the residence or business," and "[u]pon supervisor
approval, the officers will enter the residence using the least destructive
means available to them."14 2 In practice, most homes and businesses
from which 911 hang-ups occur in this department's jurisdiction are
subject to a "cursory search."143 The officer completes the search
regardless of whether the officer made contact with occupants,
regardless of the explanation, and regardless of whether an occupant
gave permission.144 This department's policy of conducting mandatory
searches is not unique.145
The challenges officers encounter when responding to 911 hang-
ups highlight the importance of defining the boundaries of police power
under the emergency aid doctrine. Because mere hang-ups do not
convey particularized information, one of the difficulties police
encounter when responding to 911 hang-ups is the lack of legal
options.'4 6 Warrants are generally issued only in those circumstances
where an officer can identify with particularity the item or person to be
searched or seized.4 7 If a medical emergency exists but there are no
outward signs of criminal activity, no assurances that the call
originated from the dwelling, or no clues as to who initiated the call,
officers have little recourse. Yet society often expects the police to act
immediately based on their discretion, training, and experience.148




145. See sources cited supra note 140; see also SAMPSON, supra note 120, at 11, 20.
146. See generally Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (discussing the probable
cause standard).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976)
(noting that warrants and "[tihe standard of probable cause [are] peculiarly related to criminal
investigations"); Dimino, supra note 18, at 1486-88. See generally Slobogin, supra note 13
(discussing the Supreme Court's idiosyncratic jurisprudence regarding warrants).
148. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1860 (2011) ("We have noted that '[tihe calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.'
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989))).
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Consequently, the emergency aid doctrine might be an officer's sole
guide when responding to potential emergencies.149
In addition to providing guidance for emergency situations,
clearer definition of the emergency aid doctrine also mitigates an
inevitable consequence: a significant number of warrantless seizures.150
Police seize contraband under the plain view doctrine, which allows
officers to seize items when two thresholds are met.51 First, the initial
intrusion must be supported either by a warrant or one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.152 The emergency
aid doctrine permits the warrantless entry of a home under certain
circumstances, thus satisfying the first threshold.153 Second, the
contraband nature of the items seized must have been apparent.154
Consequently, a warrantless entry into a home based on the emergency
aid doctrine and the subsequent viewing of apparent contraband may
fall under the plain view doctrine. A clearly defined emergency aid
doctrine is therefore the only means to protect individuals from nearly
unfettered police discretion to search homes and seize property after
receiving 911 hang-ups.
Defendants typically argue that when police find contraband
items incident to 911 searches, the police lacked articulable facts or
149. While giving officers unfettered discretion is excessive, too little discretion prevents the
police from responding to real emergencies in which a victim is unable to respond.
150. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding firearm and
knife); United States v. Obbanya, No. C 11-677 CW, 2012 WL 851129, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
2012) (finding firearms, ammunition, chemicals, computer equipment); United States v. Robbins,
No. CR11-0014, 2011 WL 1317280, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 5, 2011) (finding marijuana grow
operation); United States v. Huang, No. CR-06-00487 DLJ, 2008 WL 360546, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
8, 2008) (finding marijuana grow operation); United States v. Parker, No. CR 05-0505-PHX-NVW,
2006 WL 163562, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 20, 2006) (finding firearm); State v. Pearson-Anderson, 41
P.3d 275, 277 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (finding methamphetamine laboratory); People v. Greene, 682
N.E.2d 354, 355-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding marijuana); In re Welfare of J.W.L., 732 N.W.2d
332, 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (taking pictures of graffiti inside the home); State v. Frankel, 847
A.2d 561, 566 (N.J. 2003) (finding marijuana grow operation); State v. Hodge, No. 23964, 2011 WL
486516, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2011), (finding "drugs kind of everywhere" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
151. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). A search must be within the
scope permitted by the initial entry. In the case of the emergency aid octrine, the scope of a search
is generally considered anywhere inside the home where an injured party may be found. Generally,
the officer must stop his or her search when the person is found or the emergency ceases to exist.
In actuality, the entire house is searched regardless of whether a victim was previously found
because, theoretically, there may be other victims or a hiding perpetrator.
152. See id.
153. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam); Brigham City, Utah v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 401-02 (2006).
154. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987).
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circumstances ufficient to justify a warrantless search.5 5 On the other
hand, the state often asserts that 911 hang-ups, by their very nature,
are significant indicators of ongoing emergencies.16 The police,
therefore, have a reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists,
which justifies a warrantless search.15 7 These arguments dominate
most emergency aid cases regarding the permissible boundaries of the
doctrine, and they lead to many suppression challenges.'58 But, as
discussed below, lower courts have difficulty analyzing the
countervailing interests involved when police respond to 911 hang-ups.
C. Interpretive Conflicts
A main point of contention is what proof sufficiently justifies the
belief that an emergency aid search was necessary.59 Since 911 hang-
ups do not indicate whether a caller is being assaulted, needs an
ambulance, or has simply misdialed, officers are prepared to respond in
various ways, such as investigating crimes, rendering emergency aid to
injured parties, or explaining to a child that dialing 911 is only for
emergencies.160 Because of this ambiguity and the risk of justifying
searches after the fact, Brigham rejected an inquiry into the subjective
intent of an officer.161 The Court noted "that the subjective intent of the
law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that
officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment . . .; the issue is not his
state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions."162 In other words,
officers cannot justify a search based solely on their subjective belief
that an emergency existed; instead, they must first identify facts or
circumstances that a court can independently verify and that are
sufficient to justify a warrantless search.
The lack of individualized suspicion in the context of 911 hang-
up responses is problematic because the Supreme Court has reiterated,
"'the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry' demands that
155. See, e.g., Frankel, 847 A.2d at 567. Another common argument is that officers exceeded
the permissible scope of an emergency-circumstances search or that officers searched specific items
without probable cause. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.W.L., 732 N.W.2d at 338-40.
156. See cases cited supra note 150.
157. Id.
158. Id. Plaintiffs often make these same arguments in civil suits against the government,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), for violations of their constitutionally protected rights. See Hanson
v. Dane Cnty. Wis., 608 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2010).
159. See cases cited supra note 56.
160. See Dimino, supra note 18, at 1486 (noting only one-fifth to one-third of an officer's
activity is directed towards crime control).
161. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006).
162. Id. at 404 (emphasis added) (quoting Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000)).
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we evaluate each case of alleged exigency based 'on its own facts and
circumstances.' "163 This language strongly suggests that the Court
favors particularized suspicion, which many 911 hang-ups lack.
Furthermore, the Court seemingly disfavors generalized suspicion.164
Generalized suspicion is a belief that one person or thing is suspect just
because that person or thing shares noncriminal traits with those who
are known to be suspect.165 Generalized suspicion is often based on
profiles, statistical information, and the likelihood that a situation
exists. The likelihood that these profiles, statistics, or likelihoods are
accurate should determine whether generalized suspicion is reasonable
in a specific circumstance.16 6 So, if a significant number of 911 hang-
ups were shown to be valid emergencies, the police might generalize
that a particular hang-up is also an emergency. Yet, the Court prefers
particularized evidence, and current statistics tentatively indicate the
opposite: 911 hang-ups generally do not indicate valid, imminent
emergencies.167
Relatedly, in a particularly disturbing trend, courts are allowing
the government to use an individual's exercise of his or her Fourth
Amendment rights as evidence that the police had particularized
163. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 39 (1996)) (internal citation omitted); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1980)
("[A] search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect
to that person."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("[In justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts .... ). Checking an address's
call history could yield evidence of repeated emergencies, which may constitute suspicion because
such information is specific to an exact address or possibly a person. Yet, whether an extensive
call history, on its own, justifies a warrantless entry is also questionable because it still relies on
prior occurrences as generalized suspicion. See infra note 164.
164. Generalized suspicion is often based on commonalities or the probability that an
unknown incident (or person) is likely to share the characteristics of a profile, a prior occurrence,
or the traits of another. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. 85 (deciding that a bar patron could not be detained
where police only had generalized suspicions of drug activity in the tavern, but no particularized
suspicion that the patron was involved in the illegal drug activity); see also Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491 (1983) (involving a suspect who matched seven indicators of a drug courier profile,
justifying reasonable suspicion for a brief investigatory detention, but the match was insufficient
to establish probable cause for an arrest); Christopher Slobogin, Let's not Bury Terry: A Call for
Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053, 1085-91 (1998) (noting
that fine distinctions between individualized and generalized suspicion are conceptually
misguided and that generalized suspicion may be valid as long as the information is credible,
reliable, and sufficient (corroborated to the point of near particularized evidence) to justify the
government's intrusions).
165. See supra note 164.
166. The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the scope of such evidence. See
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION 152 (5th
ed. 2012).
167. See supra Part III.B.1.
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suspicion.168 Officers now frequently refer to a homeowner's refusal to
allow officers into the home as evidence that an emergency exists.16 9
Likewise, the police often cite an occupant's refusal to answer the door
as evidence of an emergency.17 0
While some courts wrestle with standards of proof, others invoke
consent to bypass the issue altogether.171 Absent a warrant or exception
to the warrant requirement, a party must voluntarily and validly give
consent with some specificity as to the scope of any search. 172 Normally,
a caller who remains on the line explains the nature of the problem and
asks for assistance. Thus, during traditional 911 calls, the caller is often
present and has an opportunity to extend or withdraw his or her
consent regarding a search. Drawing on this body of law, courts have
found that mere 911 hang-ups are the equivalent of waivers or consent
because callers presumably dialed 911 to receive help with the
expectation that officers would fully investigate.1 7 3
168. Nelms v. Wellington Way Apartments, LLC, 513 F. App'x 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2013) ("[A]
failure to respond to a knock on the door certainly can be a factor supporting a reasonable belief
that someone inside needs immediate aid, but it cannot create that belief."); Causey v. City of Bay
City, 442 F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that an officer need not rely on the assurances
of the person responding to the door because they could just as easily be attempts to conceal injured
parties or the result of intimidation by an unseen attacker in the residence).
169. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849,1862 (2011) ("And even ifan occupant chooses
to open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the
premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any time."); Clark ex rel T.M.J. v. Pielert,
Civil No. 07-3649(DSD/JJG), 2009 WL 35337, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2009) (finding no affirmative
duty to assist an officer's entry, but noting that a refusal to allow an officer's entry supports a
reasonable belief of an emergency); State v. Lynd, 771 P.2d 770, 771 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)
(involving a 911 hang-up along with a homeowner's refusal to allow officer's entry). But see United
States v. Shook, No. 1:12-CR-74-BLW, 2013 WL 2354085, at *4 (D. Idaho May 29, 2013) ('There is
nothing inherently suspicious about the quite common event of a dog barking in response to a
doorbell and nobody answering the door.").
170. E.g., Nelms, 513 F. App'x at 547; United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir.
2008) ("Without any objective evidence of physical distress, the failure of anyone to respond to the
agents' knocking at the front and back doors of Troop's house also becomes insufficient to create
exigent circumstances."); supra note 169 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Rakun v. Kendall Cnty., Texas, No. SA-06-CV-1044-XR, 2007 WL 2815571, at
*22 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2007).
172. The validity of consent generally relies on voluntariness, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 223-24 (1973), the scope of consent, see Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51
(1991), and the authority to give consent, see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71
(1974).
173. Rakun, 2007 WL 2815571, at *22:
Thus, 'a homeowner's 911 call requesting immediate assistance at his home is ... actual
consent shown by circumstantial evidence.' By making an emergency 911 call, 'surely
the objectively reasonable homeowner envisions that the responding police will enter
his home, view the scene, take pictures of that scene, and make a cursory search for
relevant evidence directly relating to the homeowner's emergency call.'
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); see
State v. Pearson-Anderson, 41 P.3d 275, 279 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) ("[W]e cannot ignore the fact
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Other issues, such as concerns over an officer's civil liability,
may tacitly affect a court's analysis. For instance, courts may be
inclined to find warrantless searches after 911 hang-ups permissible
due to the need to protect officers and departments from potential
liability for actions that their communities support. After all,
communities (and their police departments) may find some comfort and
only minimal inconvenience in the certitude of 911 hang-up
responses.174 For example, an officer may decide to enter a home just in
case an emergency was preventing the caller from communicating. The
officer might avoid civil liability if she acted in good faith, even if the
search was unconstitutional.1 7 5 Yet, some courts have reasoned that if
the officer's search was not objectively reasonable, the officer cannot
claim that she acted in good faith.176 Consequently, the officer or her
department may be subject to heightened criticism and possibly
liability if a court determines that her search was not objectively
reasonable.177 Presuming that 911 hang-ups are emergencies therefore
helps protect officers for actions taken in good faith, even if an
emergency was not apparent. Ironically, such a presumption not only
facilitates an extraconstitutional search, but it also protects an officer
from liability for the search, whether undertaken in good faith or not.
Finally, courts may not want to discourage the police from
responding promptly and effectively to emergency situations. The police
are identified and trained as first responders, and they are integral and
necessary parts of emergency responses. They may be the first on scene,
and they are trained and equipped to assess and deescalate volatile
that by making the 911 call, Pearson-Anderson herself diminished her reasonable expectation of
privacy within her home by summoning police officers to the premises with an implied
representation that an emergency was occurring.").
174. United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2008) ('The possibility that immediate
police action will prevent injury or death outweighs the inconvenience we suffer when the police
interrupt our ordinary routines in response to what turns out to be a non-emergency call."). In
contrast to the Snipe court's characterization, this Note does not view a warrantless search of a
home a mere "inconvenience."
175. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (holding that for § 1983 liability,
good faith is not enough and conduct must be reasonable). But see Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196
F.3d 41, 49-51 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding no liability when an officer entered a home without a
warrant and without any indication of an ongoing emergency, but based on a good faith intent to
prevent domestic violence). See generally Badway v. City of Philadelphia, No. 07-1333, 2009 WL
2569260, at *5-10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2010) (discussing municipal liability for flawed 911 services).
176. See Anderson, 483 U.S. 635.
177. This concern may be what prompts departments to adopt wide-ranging 911 hang-up
search policies similar to the mandatory search policies discussed above. An officer may not be
found personally liable because he or she followed published and standardized department
procedures. Policies of this nature still do not address the fundamental issue of whether the search
was constitutionally permissible. These policies may merely shift liability from the officer to the
department and its parent organization.
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situations. Importantly, they also have the means to ensure the safety
of other responders.78 Restricting an officer's response to emergency
situations, therefore, impacts other responders.79 In addition, limiting
the ability of the police to secure a scene prevents the collection of
evidence and statements, and it puts other emergency responders in
danger of entering volatile situations for which they are not trained.
IV. WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY: ENSURING
PUBLIC SAFETY DOES NOT OVERTAKE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
The Supreme Court avoids strict search-and-seizure rules in
favor of a totality of the circumstances analysis.80 For this reason, the
Supreme Court may be hesitant to adopt bright-line rules that 911
hang-ups, on their own, cannot justify warrantless searches. Likewise,
the Court is unlikely to deem generalized suspicion sufficient to justify
warrantless searches of homes because of the Court's stated preference
for particularized evidence. Consequently, this Note emphasizes that
911 hang-ups and other warrantless searches based on the emergency
aid doctrine must be analyzed under the evidentiary standards set forth
in Brigham and Fisher. That is, each search must be undertaken based
on its own specific facts and circumstances, not generalized suspicion.
A. An Analytical Framework
The context in which Brigham and Fisher arose is the key to
understanding the Court's emergency aid doctrine. Lower courts
confuse a general possibility of imminent harm with the
contemporaneous and particularized indices of imminent harm
identified in both Brigham and Fisher.181 Part of the confusion arises
from the Court's suggestion in Fisher that a police officer's need to
ensure the protection of unknown parties is an objectively reasonable
178. Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 253-55 (6th Cir. 2003) (commenting on the
dual needs of safeguarding paramedics while also tending to a patient's injuries).
179. Stricker v. Town of Cambridge, 710 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding a warrantless
entry permissible because there was affirmative evidence of a medical emergency and a need to
protect ambulance personnel from a hostile situation).
180. Totality of the circumstances means all the facts, the context, and the circumstances of
a particular incident that, considered together, either support or fail to support government action.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-39 (1983).
181. United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006) (Berzon, J., dissenting) ("To
prove that such [emergency] circumstances existed, the government cannot rely on speculation
about what may or might not have happened. Instead, it must point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences support the warrantless intrusion." (internal
quotations and citation omitted)).
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basis for a warrantless search.182 Context, however, is important. In
Fisher, there was an apparent threat: the police saw the defendant
destroying and throwing property.183 That apparent threat was the
basis for a contemporaneous belief that another unseen party was or
could become injured.184 In their interpretation and application of
Fisher, lower courts are expanding the emergency aid doctrine by
ignoring the factual basis behind Fisher's decision-a contemporaneous
apparent threat. Instead, some lower courts justify warrantless
searches based on the theoretical possibility of imminent harm, inferred
from a 911 hang-up, without first identifying any observable, actual
threat.18
Identifying an apparent threat is a key threshold. It links the
possibility of danger to unseen parties to a concrete and
contemporaneous event.86 Absent this link, the emergency aid doctrine
becomes a probabilities experiment divorced from reasonableness, and
it fails to align with the Court's existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In both Brigham and Fisher, the police made
contemporaneous and particularized observations, which led to
reasonable beliefs that their entries were necessary to protect people
and property. Only then were warrantless entries into the defendants'
homes permissible.
Initially, a court must decide what contemporaneous and
particularized evidence a given 911 hang-up actually conveys. At most,
911 hang-up calls that go unanswered on callback merely demonstrate
that a means of communication was activated (either intentionally or
unintentionally) from a caller's location. This potential effort to
communicate should not be interpreted as an emergency: what any
given hang-up communicates is too tenuous to justify a general
presumption that 911 hang-ups are emergencies. Hang-ups convey
nothing about who actually called or why. As a result, the police need
to develop their own independent evidence about whether an actual
emergency exists. Thus, the proper focus of any judicial inquiry should
be the quality and quantity of the information conveyed to the police,
which they may use to form an objectively reasonable basis that
182. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See generally cases cited supra note 56.
186. E.g., United States v. Meixner, No. 00-CR-20025-BC, 2000 WL 1597736, at *9 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 26, 2000) ("[W]ithout some positive indication to the contrary-some objective manifestation of
the existence of an emergency situation demanding immediate action-the officers were not justified
in physically intruding into the sanctity of the home.").
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imminent harm exists, as Brigham and Fisher require.187 Ultimately,
interpreting 911 calls in this manner maintains a court's focus on
objective indicators of an emergency and away from generalized
presumptions.
On the other hand, if the Court does change course and
legitimize generalized suspicion, such evidence will still require some
corroboration (i.e. showing that a particular 911 hang-up shares
sufficient traits with known emergencies). Yet, little or no corroboration
may be possible because many 911 hang-ups convey little or no
information.188 If police respond to a location believed to be the origin of
a 911 hang-up and no one responds to their inquiries and they fail to
observe anything out of the ordinary, there is no corroboration that an
emergency exists. Furthermore, even if most 911 hang-ups were found
to be emergencies, it is unclear whether corroborating only the receipt
of a 911 hang-up would justify the warrantless entry and search of a
home's interior.189 The difficulty of determining a caller's identity,
location, and reason for the hang-up call further suggests the need for
some independent corroboration that an emergency exists.190 Thus,
allowing warrantless searches based on a generalized suspicion that
911 hang-ups are emergencies is nearly tantamount to a general police
warrant authorizing indiscriminate searches and seizures, the very
intrusion the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.
Additionally, presuming that 911 hang-ups are emergencies
results in implicit burden shifting whereby citizens are required to
prove why their privacy should not be infringed, instead of the
government proving why their privacy should be invaded. Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence requires the police to develop a certain
187. Where exactly this standard lies within our established framework of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause is outside of the intended scope of this Note. Regardless, officers
must be able to point to some apparent and imminent threat, yet not be required to actually see
or hear an injured party before acting. As Brigham noted, "The role of a peace officer includes
preventing violence and restoring order ..... Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006).
188. See United States v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2009) (adopting a proportionality
analysis that balances a call's reliability with its level of corroboration; if more of one existed, less
of the other was needed); People v. Lomax, 975 N.E.2d 115, 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (Garcia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the anonymous call received was not corroborated in any way prior to the
warrantless entry).
189. Lomax, 975 N.E.2d at 140-41 (Garcia, J., dissenting) ("Whether a single call provides a
reasonable basis necessarily turns on the details conveyed in the 911 call."); cf. Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (holding that a suspect matching a "drug courier profile" did not provide
the police with probable cause warranting even a detention).
190. See Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129, 136 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting the
significance of the caller's location being corroborated and the certitude that the 911 call came
from an exact address).
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quantum of proof in order to justify an intrusion.191 In deeming 911
hang-ups per se emergencies, courts allow warrantless entries without
the need to form particularized suspicion.192 Consequently, the burden
implicitly shifts to the homeowner to rebut an emergency
presumption. 193 And because the police may not believe a homeowner's
reassurances that there are no problems, the only way for an officer to
dispel a 911 emergency presumption is to search a home to ensure that
an emergency truly does not exist.194
It is therefore critical for the police to articulate a
contemporaneous belief that an apparent emergency exists, thus
ensuring that officers acted within the sphere of a true crisis like that
191. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 50 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that the
government bears the burden of proof to justify a warrantless entry to protect or preserve life).
State courts are free to impose higher standards for searches and seizures than those required by
the Federal Constitution. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008). Federal courts and many
states adhere to Brigham's objective tests. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 973 N.E.2d 115,
123 (Mass. 2012). A few states additionally require an inquiry into the subjective intent of the
officer. See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 267 P.3d 645, 658 (Alaska 2012) (setting forth a three-part test);
Hall v. State, 14 A.3d 512, 515-16 (Del. 2011) (same); State v. Schultz, 248 P.3d 484, 487-88
(Wash. 2011) (adopting a six-part inquiry).
192. See State v. Hodge, No. 23964, 2011 WL 486516, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2011):
In our view, the 911 hang-up call created a reasonable belief that an emergency existed,
requiring investigation by law enforcement officers . . . . [We find these types of calls
to inherently be emergencies. In fact, the emergency of these situations only ceases once
the emergency responder is able to ascertain whether someone is in need of aid. .. . [Alt
times, this discovery can only be made by gaining entrance to the location from which
the call was placed.
But see United States v. Bridges, No. 1:08CR5, 2008 WL 2433881, at *3, 6-10 (N.D. W. Va. June
12, 2008) (invalidating an emergency aid search based on a neighbor's anonymous 911 call
regarding a possible domestic dispute at the defendant's home because the police were unable to
corroborate that an emergency existed but nevertheless entered the home). Unlike in Hodge, the
officers in Bridges had the benefit of additional information: the 911 call gave a specific complaint
occurring at a specific address, and the officers spoke to the defendant and observed him, his son,
and the inside of his home through the doorway. Yet, the officers acknowledged and the court
properly determined that the officers failed to observe anything out of the ordinary before entering
the home. Without corroboration, the officers' warrantless entry was impermissible.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Huang, No. CR-06-00487 DLJ, 2008 WL 360546, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Feb 8, 2008) ("[O]nce the police have been summoned via a 911 call, it is incumbent on them
to assure that their assistance is not truly needed.").
194. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, No. CR 05-0505-PHX-NVW, 2006 WL 163562 at *3-4
(D. Ariz. Jan. 20, 2006):
[T]he events following the initial 911 hang-up call did not dispel the police officers'
concern that an emergency was occurring . . .. The court finds as a matter of fact that
the entering officers were directly motivated by their authority and duty to investigate
the unresolved 911 call, to which they could get no information short of entry .... ;
State v. Myers, Nos. 9-02-65, 9-02-66, 2003 WL 21321402, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2003)
(concluding that information that children could be in a house without parents present but not
knowing whether anyone in the house was harmed justified entering without a warrant).
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in Brigham and in Fisher.195 Brigham and Fisher were clear: officers
must justify their actions with specific and particularized suspicion in
order to justify a subsequent search. A court's analysis, then, ought to
be limited to evidence known and considered by the officer and used to
justify a warrantless search.196 This inquiry includes only those factual
circumstances that are indices of an apparent emergency and can be
corroborated in a judicial proceeding.197 This way, courts will exclude
uncorroborated subjective beliefs, thus maintaining the Brigham
objectiveness standard. Such a standard still enables police to meet
societal expectations regarding 911 police responses while excluding
those situations where dangers are not apparent, such as 911 hang-ups
where the responding officers encounter calm, silent, or otherwise
benign circumstances.198 Adhering to these simple rules properly
focuses the judicial inquiry on the government's burden to justify its
actions, and it maintains the balance between compelling government
interests and individual rights.
Relatedly, courts should not consider the exercise of
constitutional rights as evidence to justify a warrantless entry.
Individuals have no obligation to respond to an officer's knocks and are
not required to let officers into their homes without a warrant. Instead,
a citizen has the continuous right not to be subject to unreasonable
searches.199 As one federal court noted, "There is nothing inherently
suspicious about the quite common event of a dog barking in response
to a doorbell and nobody answering the door."200 Nor does the
"theoretical possibility of exigent circumstances" justify a warrantless
195. See generally sources cited supra note 56 and accompanying text. Unsubstantiated
generalized suspicion may at times be a proxy for the court's own subjective beliefs. See Myers,
2003 WL 21321402, at *3:
We refuse to base the reasonableness of a warrantless entry into a home from which a
911 call has originated, and the nature of which is unknown, on the percentage of these
types of calls that are non-emergencies in nature. Rather, we find these types of calls
to inherently be emergencies. In fact, the emergency of these situations only ceases once
the emergency responder is able to ascertain whether someone is in need of aid.
196. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (U.S. 2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The
existence of a genuine emergency depends not only on the state of necessity at the time of the
warrantless search; it depends, first and foremost, on 'actions taken by the police preceding the
warrantless search.'" (quoting United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 2006))).
197. This may include the consideration of generalized suspicion in the overall totality of the
circumstances if such suspicion were corroborated.
198. See State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 226-29 (S.D. 2009) (discussing a
methamphetamine lab found during a warrantless search and investigation of an ammonia leak).
199. See United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2008).
200. United States v. Shook, No. 1:12-CR-74-BLW, 2013 WL 2354085, at *4 (D. Idaho May
29, 2013).
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entry.201 An omnipresent right to be free from unreasonable searches
attaches wherever an expectation of privacy in the home exists.202 To
use a person's exercise of his or her Fourth Amendment right to justify
its very abrogation is unconscionable. Accordingly, courts should not
entertain any notion that a citizen must dispel an officer's mere
presumption that an emergency exists.
Likewise, a caller's reasonable expectation of receiving help
should not shift the burden or abrogate the constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches.203 A state's constitution and common
law may provide more protection against searches than the Federal
Constitution, but they may not afford less.2 0 4 Thus, even if there were
mainstream support for 911 hang-up warrantless searches, those
desires should not trump the constitutional interests of a minority who
may find warrantless searches abhorrent.205
Incidentally, many courts refuse to imply tort and contractual
duties upon both 911 operators and the police for their actions or
failures to act in the course of investigating 911 calls.2 06 Additionally,
Supreme Court precedent strongly indicates that neither due process
nor equal protection commands such responsibility.2 0 7 Thus, requiring
201. Moreno v. City of Brownsville, No. B-08-504, 2011 WL 3813105, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
26, 2011).
202. The right to refuse unreasonable entry expressly or through silence may be analogized
to the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Once the right attaches, the use as evidence of
one's constitutional rights should be prohibited. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)
("It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 477 (1971))); supra text accompanying note 11.
203. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (noting
that there is no affirmative constitutional duty to protect individuals, although a common-law duty
to respond may exist); Cummins v. Lewis Cnty., 98 P.3d 822, 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (refusing
to find duty and reliance when officers failed to respond to 911 caller who merely said an address
and hung up, and rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that "the enhanced 911 system automatically
creates privity between the caller and the operator by electronically identifying the call's location
and eliminating the caller's need to speak to the operator").
205. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (noting that states remain free to impose
standards for searches and seizures greater than those required by the Federal Constitution).
205. Yet, an unreasonable search is itself a Fourth Amendment constitutional injury for which
there is a remedy through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Thus, an aggrieved party may sue police officers
and police departments for unreasonable searches. This is a strong indication that the Court favors
a person's right against unreasonable searches, for which there is a remedy, over an individual's
expectation that the police will respond, for which there is no remedy, at least in situations where
an apparent emergency does not exist.
206. See Cummins, 98 P.3d at 826.
207. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (noting that a benefit is
not a protected entitlement under the Due Process Clause if the government may grant or deny
the benefit at its discretion); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195, 200:
[T]he language of the Due Process Clause itself [does not] require[] the State to protect
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. . . . The
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the government to prove its burden is not only consistent with current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence but also with related constitutional
doctrines regarding law enforcement's duties and responsibilities.
Furthermore, hang-ups lack particularized evidence sufficient to
demonstrate knowing and voluntary consent. In fact, substantial
evidence shows that most 911 hang-ups are inadvertent.208 Moreover,
hang-ups do not identify callers, their authority to consent, or the
permissible scope of a search.209 Furthermore, a search incident to a 911
hang-up often occurs outside the presence of the caller and without his
or her ability to withdraw or limit the scope of the search. For these
reasons, the consent theory must fail.210
Taking the consent argument to its logical conclusion also leads
to two strange circumstances. First, 911 calls may be criminal, civil, or
medical in nature.211 Consent based on 911 hang-ups, therefore, could
lead to unlimited police power to investigate 911 hang-up calls. Since
the nature of any given 911 hang-up is unknown, a resulting search
could likewise be nearly unlimited. Second, consent based on 911 hang-
ups would constitute full consent, even though a caller who remains on
the line preserves the right to limit a search of his or her home. The
consent theory shifts the government's burden onto homeowners,
requiring them to dispel a presumption of consent. This burden shifting
affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which
it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.
208. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
209. See generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738-39 (1993). The authors conducted a
survey that ranked respondents' perceptions regarding invasion of privacy, with one being the
least intrusive and fifty the most intrusive. They found that a search of a mobile home ranked
forty-five and a search of a bedroom forty-seven, thus indicating that respondents found these
invasions to be some of the most intrusive. These are the same types of invasions occurring during
many 911 hang-up warrantless searches, and it is questionable whether even intentional 911
callers intend their mere calls to constitute consent to invade sensitive areas of their homes.
Professor Slobogin also suggests an approach whereby the invasiveness of a search must be
proportional to the suspicion justifying the search. See Slobogin, supra note 13, at 68-75. Under
this approach, presuming that 911 hang-ups constitute implicit consent for the police to search a
home ignores whether the intrusiveness of the search (which respondents of his study ranked as
highly intrusive) is proportional to the likelihood that an emergency exists (which is not
statistically supported).
210. See Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 254-55 (6th Cir. 2003) (deciding that
calling 911 does not amount to consent, but that it may indicate a lessened expectation of privacy).
211. People call 911 for many reasons, not just to report a crime or to seek medical assistance.
They also call about vehicle accidents, child custody disputes, abandoned vehicles and parking
complaints, domestic discord, mental health issues, juvenile behavioral problems, questions
regarding civil law issues, lost property, and requests to check the wellbeing of the elderly,
intoxicated, and mentally ill, just to name a few. See THE OVERLOADED 9-1-1 SYSTEM, supra note
113, at 13-15 (describing 911 abuses).
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is contrary to established principles regarding the waiver of
constitutional rights and contrary to the government's burden to show
voluntary and knowing consent before conducting a warrantless search.
Finally, the consent theory is unnecessary. While the
government's compelling need to respond to an emergency may
supersede the need to obtain consent, emergency aid searches do not
require consent at all. Emergency aid warrantless searches and consent
are independent and alternative means of accomplishing the same goal:
gaining entry into a protected area. Allowing police to claim implied
consent to justify a warrantless search based solely on the receipt of a
911 hang-up, absent any particularized evidence that an emergency
exists, impermissibly bypasses the government's burden of proof for
both warrants and consent. Consequently, the consent theory, like the
911 hang-up emergency presumption, risks sanctioning nearly
indiscriminate and limitless searches based on unknown facts and
circumstances.
B. An Analogy and a Reasonable Compromise
The above discussion illustrates that the only remaining
bulwark against impermissible police discretion to investigate 911
hang-ups is a resolute adherence to particularized evidence. A separate
but analogous analysis occurs in the context of anonymous calls. Due to
the questionable veracity of information provided by anonymous
callers, courts are generally wary of giving anonymous information too
much weight.212 In fact, courts often treat anonymous information as
inherently suspect. The police must corroborate anonymous
information to ensure that they develop their own objective and
particularized evidence before acting upon the anonymous tip. This
Note argues that a similar analysis should apply to 911 hang-ups, an
approach that at least some courts have adopted.213
In United States v. Cohen,214 law enforcement received a 911
hang-up call. While responding to the call, an officer stopped a vehicle
leaving the address from which the call originated and arrested the
driver.215 The driver challenged his arrest on the basis that the officer
212. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) ("[A]n anonymous tip alone seldom
demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity."); infra text accompanying note 220.
213. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) ("[Tlhere are situations in which an anonymous
tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits 'sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable
suspicion. . . .' (emphasis added) (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327)).
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lacked sufficient cause to stop his vehicle.216 The court agreed, "We
believe that the 911 hang-up call, standing alone without follow-up calls
by a dispatcher or other information is most analogous to an anonymous
tip."217 Citing Florida v. J.L.,218 the court added that anonymous tips
may "provide[ ] no predictive information and therefore [leave] the
police without means to test the informant's knowledge or
credibility."219 Since the knowledge or credibility of a caller often cannot
be corroborated, the Cohen court stated that the 911 hang-up had
limited or no weight in evaluating the totality of the circumstances.22 0
Thus, the officer in Cohen lacked even reasonable suspicion to make the
initial, investigatory traffic stop.2 21
Likewise, the court in Kerman v. City of New York reached
similar conclusions where a 911 caller provided the dispatcher with
limited information and remained anonymous.222 The sparse
information directed police to an address where there was allegedly a
suicidal man with a gun.2 23 Although the police could not corroborate
the anonymous tip, they forcefully entered the home and took its
resident into custody.224 The resident subsequently brought suit
alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.225 Citing Florida
v. J.L.'s anonymous tip analysis, the Kerman court found that the
officers lacked a basis for conducting a warrantless entry,
notwithstanding the alleged gravity of the tip: "Based on the absence of
evidence in the record to corroborate the 911 call and the protections
afforded to private dwellings under the Fourth Amendment, we find
that the officers' warrantless entry into Kerman's apartment violated
the Fourth Amendment."226
216. Id.
217. Id. at 899.
218. 529 U.S. at 271.
219. Cohen, 481 F.3d at 899 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 271).
220. Id. at 901:
Even if we were to assume that an anonymous 911 report is more reliable than other
similar anonymous tips, however, we believe that the virtually complete lack of
information conveyed by the silent 911 hang-up call and the total absence of
corroborating evidence indicating that criminal activity was afoot requires us to give
the 911 hang-up call little weight in evaluating the totality of the circumstances.
221. Id.
222. Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 232-33 (2d Cir. 2001). Other courts have
come to similar conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Sikut, 488 F. Supp. 2d 291, 316 (W.D.N.Y.
2007) (finding an anonymous 911 call without any on-scene objective indicators was insufficient to
justify a warrantless entry).
223. Kerman, 261 F.3d at 232-33.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 234.
226. Id. at 236.
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Under the anonymous tip analysis, officers must attempt to
corroborate anonymous information through affirmative, articulable
observations because the reliability of the anonymous information is
suspect.227 As a result, the police do not need ironclad proof of an
emergency, but their belief must be based on more than a mere hunch
or possibility that an emergency exists.228 Similarly, the court in United
States v. Espinoza aptly noted: "We do not read [Fisher's] fact-specific
opinion to hold broadly that warrantless entry into a home is always
justified where the police cannot confirm that there are no injured
victims inside a house."229 Applying the anonymous tip analysis to 911
hang-ups means that officers investigating 911 hang-ups must
corroborate their information and develop particularized evidence
sufficient to justify taking immediate and warrantless action.
Although the police may not discover some valid emergencies if
this analysis applies, our criminal justice system is not predicated on
maximum utility at the expense of personal iberty. To the contrary, our
system attempts to achieve optimal efficiency while also maintaining
fundamental rights, even if the system thereby produces the occasional
undesirable result.2 30 In the interest of preserving fundamental rights,
it may be better that some emergencies go unaddressed rather than
many more people suffer the indignity of unreasonable government
227. See United States v. Bridges, No. 1:08CR5, 2008 WL 2433881 at *2-3 (N.D. W. Va. June
12, 2008) (finding an anonymous 911 call regarding possible domestic assault insufficient to justify
a warrantless search of home when the occupant gave a clear rebuke refusing the officer's entry
and there was no other corroborating evidence that an assault occurred); see also United States v.
Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[I]t is ... incumbent upon the government to point
to some affirmative sign of exigency" beyond merely remaining silent to an officer's inquiries.).
228. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 48-50 (2009) (per curiam); Delgado, 701 F.3d at
1165.
229. United States v. Espinoza, 403 F. App'x 239, 241 (9th Cir. 2010); see also United States
v. Shook, No. 1:12-CR-74-BLW, 2013 WL 2354085, at *5 (D. Idaho May 29, 2013) (citing United
States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005)) ("The Government has not borne its 'heavy
burden' of presenting 'particularized evidence' to justify the application of the emergency
exception."); Moreno v. City of Brownsville, No. B-08-504, 2011 WL 3813105, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Aug
26, 2011) ("Exigent circumstances are not created by the theoretical possibility of exigent
circumstances being present within a home."). Relatedly, the inability to gain the exact location
from wireless callers additionally creates a problem in establishing a link between the person
calling 911 and the place to be searched. Under this Note's analysis, a warrantless entry in order
to verify a 911 hang-up is invalid without contemporaneous and particularized evidence of an
emergency. See United States v. Deemer, 354 F.3d 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2004) (invalidating a
warrantless entry into a hotel room because the 911 call received could not be associated with a
specific room).
230. Blackstone's maxim, in all its harshness, nicely illustrates the importance of uniform
and just laws: "It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
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searches. Fortunately, available data suggest that very few 911 hang-
ups are imminent emergencies.231
Nonetheless, police should be allowed a limited and reasonable
incursion onto the curtilage of the home in order to effectively respond
to 911 hang-ups.232 For instance, when responding to the suspected
source of a hang-up call, courts might permit the police to enter a home's
curtilage,233 including walking around and inspecting a home's
exterior.234 These actions are minimally intrusive yet frequently
successful when attempting to contact an occupant.235 Thus, drawing a
"bright line" at the threshold of the home, while still allowing limited
but reasonable entry into the curtilage for responses to a possible
emergency, may be compatible with already-established Fourth
Amendment standards.236
Likewise, officers investigating 911 hang-ups may need to
extend their attempts to contact an occupant to other areas outside the
home, such as back doors and windows. While these are often protected
areas, officers investigating 911 hang-ups are merely attempting to
contact someone within the home. While a 911 call does not indicate an
emergency situation, it does establish that a means of communication
was triggered, even if inadvertently. Attempting to contact an occupant
while responding to a 911 call, therefore, is fundamentally different
than an investigatory search inside the home. Thus, a nonintrusive
response, including a limited incursion into a home's curtilage, should
be reasonable if confined to areas outside the home and limited to the
231. See supra Part III.B.1.
232. See supra text accompanying note 134.
233. See United States v. Robbins, No. CR11-0014, 2011 WL 1317280, at *5-6 (N.D. Iowa Apr.
5, 2011) (holding that a 911 open line (busy signal) justified a limited intrusion onto curtilage).
234. United States v. Moore, 453 F. App'x 401, 403 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted):
We have noted, however, that the Fourth Amendment does not invariably forbid an
officer's warrantless entry into an area surrounding a residential dwelling, even when
the officer has not first knocked at the front door. A police officer may enter property
adjacent to a home when the officer possesses a legitimate reason for doing so that is
unconnected with a search of the premises.
235. See Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 254 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003) (declining to hold
that a 911 call alone may justify a warrantless entry, but suggesting that it may justify a lesser,
limited response); Shook, 2013 WL 2354085, at *3 (allowing limited investigation into the curtilage
of a home after a 911 hang-up).
236. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn
a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant."). Thus, the protection afforded to areas outside the home
may be distinguishable from areas inside it. For example, the police are reasonably permitted to
enter a home's curtilage for the purpose of contacting occupants within. See, e.g., United States v.
Walker, 474 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that opening a storm door was not a search);
People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 935 (Cal. 1999) (suggesting that an officer's intrusion onto private
property during a potential emergency is permissible because a similarly situated private citizen
may intrude onto private property to responding to a potential emergency).
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express purpose of responding to an occupant's apparent attempt o
communicate.237
If additional observations suggest that an emergency exists,
further investigatory efforts may be appropriate. If these efforts yield
no additional information, however, officers have responded to the
maximum extent the law deems reasonable while not violating the
inner sanctum of the home. Distinguishing between the curtilage and
the interior of the home thus balances the need to respond to
emergencies against the high level of government intrusion inherent in
any search of the interior of a home.
The above framework protects an individual's right to be free
from unreasonable government intrusions, while giving the police
better guidelines for executing emergency aid warrantless searches and
the courts a basis for analyzing those searches. The framework achieves
this balance by requiring the police to observe particularized evidence
of an apparent emergency. It also requires the government to bear the
burden of proving such an emergency existed while prohibiting the use
of uncorroborated generalized evidence or implicit consent. This
framework also seeks a reasonable compromise by allowing a limited
intrusion into the curtilage of a home to investigate a potential
emergency after receipt of a 911 hang-up. The resulting framework thus
realigns lower-court practice with the standards articulated in Brigham
and Fisher, while also attempting to meet contemporary expectations
for 911 hang-up responses.
V. CONCLUSION
Of the tens of millions of 911 hang-ups occurring on a yearly
basis, studies indicate that few are legitimate calls for help, and fewer
yet are imminent emergencies. Unfortunately, some lower courts fail to
narrowly interpret the emergency aid doctrine, which allows the police
to enter homes when they have a reasonable basis to believe that an
emergency exists. The failure to narrowly interpret the doctrine has
transformed the exception into an amorphous, untamed general writ.
The result is an extraordinary expansion of police power to intrude into
the home, make arrests, and allow courts to convict under
circumstances divorced from apparent emergencies.
This Note suggests that the omnipresent constitutional interest
against unreasonable searches must take priority over the expectations
of those who fail to adequately communicate the existence of an
237. See Robbins, 2011 WL 1317280, at *5- (holding that a 911 open line (busy signal)
justified a limited intrusion onto curtilage).
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emergency. Furthermore, the government must point to
contemporaneous and particularized evidence of apparent imminent
harm before conducting a warrantless search under the emergency aid
doctrine. Strict adherence to Brigham and Fisher ensures that officers
have the flexibility they need, while preserving a citizen's core
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches.
In addition, treating 911 hang-ups like anonymous tips and
permitting the police to make limited incursions into the curtilage of a
home accommodates evolving means of communication and changing
societal expectations regarding emergency police responses. It also
maintains consistency with current search-and-seizure jurisprudence
while recognizing the difficulty of divorcing police officers' crime-
fighting and community protecting roles. Thus, adhering to the
contextual tenets of Brigham and Fisher and following this Note's
suggested framework may prevent the emergency aid doctrine from
devolving into the modern general warrant.
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